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Troublesome Women and the Nanny State: 
Drawing Boundaries and Legislating Bifurcated Belonging in Patriarchal Singapore 
 
Eugene K.B. Tan 
 
 
    If this is a nanny state, I am proud to have fostered one.[1] 
    Lee Kuan Yew 
 
      
    Singapore was and remains an immigrant society. The immigration of new citizens and temporary 
workers has become the primary means by which the population is replenished and right-sized for its 
economic and demographic requirements. More than one in three persons (or 38.6 percent) living in 
Singapore are foreigners (non-citizens, including permanent residents) in 2013.[2] Of the 3.45 million 
working population in Singapore, about 38 percent (or about 1,296,800 persons are foreigners.[3] The 
vast majority of these foreigners are transient workers (migrant workers) on short-term work permits. Of 
these, about 211,000—all women—are employed as domestic help (or ‘maids’ in local parlance) as of 
June 2013. 
      
    Singapore is also severely under-reproducing. In 2010, Singapore’s total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.15 
(1.15 babies per resident woman), among the lowest in the world.[4] In 2012, Singapore’s TFR was 1.29. 
However, the low TFR is not a recent phenomenon and is likely to persist. It has been below the 
replacement level of 2.1 since 1976. Hence, from the policy-makers’ perspective, there is a pressing need 
to top up Singapore’s population, and to import foreign labour power at all levels to meet Singapore’s 
economic needs.[5] At the same time, the Singapore government is selective in admitting permanent 
residents and naturalised citizens.[6] 
      
    Not surprisingly, concerns have been raised over the relatively high proportion of foreigners in 
Singapore.[7] This dependence on foreign labour, whether high-skilled or low-skilled, has been an 
abiding feature of Singapore’s economic life.[8] Singapore’s political leadership has urged Singaporeans 
to accept the 'trade-offs' of an economy heavily dependent on foreign labour to feed its appetite for strong 
economic growth rates. As the then National Development Minister said in 2008, 'If we want fewer 
foreign workers, we must be prepared for slower growth, higher costs, lower service levels and delays in 
the completion of our flats, our roads, our rail lines.'[9] Narayanan Ganesan succinctly observes of 
migrant workers and professionals in Singapore's political economy: 
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        Their presence allays fears regarding the long-term sustainability of the country, sustains high 
economic growth levels, and lowers the cost of social reproduction. Additionally, migrants from Asia are 
comfortable with the status quo in Singapore and less likely than citizens to challenge the tone and temper 
of the domestic political culture.[10]  
 
    In this article, I describe how government policies, societal norms, and laws towards migration of 
women out of and into Singapore impinge upon the normative conception of Singapore as a patriarchal 
state. This patriarchal normativity sits uncomfortably with the constitutional requirement of equality of 
persons (not limited to citizens only), of equality before the law, and entitlement to the equal protection of 
the law.[11] While it aspires to be a global city like New York and London, Singapore—as a nation-
state—has to be simultaneously watchful of the realities and imperatives of being a sovereign nation-
state. In short, Singapore's global city aspirations are reflexively in tension with and have to be in sync 
with Singapore's nation-building requirements. This tension invariably constrains the full expression of 
patriarchy as a mode of managing social, economic and political dynamics to maintain gender relations at 
the workplace, and home, and society. 
      
    A global city has to be open to the inflows and outflows of people, ideas and financial capital. A 
nation-state, on the other hand, seeks to regulate those movements in the interest of moulding a national 
identity and the pursuit of desired societal values. This often entails a relatively less liberal citizenship 
regime with onerous requirements for citizenship and permanent residence. But like many industrialised 
economies, Singapore is experiencing a rise in international marriages, a disconcertingly low birth rate, 
the challenges of migration—including the immigration of foreign transient workers and professionals—
as well as the growth of a significant overseas Singaporean community. Consequently, the citizenship 
regime in Singapore has to strategically adapt in order to bolster socio-political policy imperatives as well 
as to engender economic development. The imperative for Singapore to be intrinsically global (in terms of 
its people thinking and operating beyond Singapore's borders) and outwardly global (so that Singapore 
remains attractive to talented foreigners) generates a new set of political, socio-economic and cultural 
dynamics that challenge the status quo. 
      
    I argue that due to the pragmatic considerations of demography and economics, and the patriarchal 
style of political governance, the law and policy regime has viewed and continues to view, to varying 
degrees, women migrants as troublesome. In particular, it considers how the immigration regulatory 
framework has differentially managed two categories of women: Singaporean women in international 
marriages, and foreign women working and living in Singapore as transient workers, especially as 
domestic workers. Both groups of women have foreign and local elements. The former used to have an 
inchoate existence within the Singaporean body polity while the latter has been regarded as a necessary 
evil, consigned to a tightly regulated, transient existence in Singapore with little or no possibility of being 
included into the Singaporean body polity. 
      
    I contend that even with a more liberal attitude towards core issues such as citizenship, ethnic 
identities, and gender equality, the statist imperatives vis-à-vis the family, citizenship and foreign labour 
will persist and buttress the continued institutional influence, if not control, by the state over how 
Singapore society defines itself in these terms. Consequently, a bifurcated regime results, giving 
differentiated rights to Singaporean women in international marriages and foreign domestic workers in 
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Singapore. This bifurcated treatment has a dual intent. The first intent is to enhance the connectedness and 
belonging of Singaporean women in international marriages to Singapore. The second intent is to ensure 
that foreign domestic workers have only a transient presence in Singapore and are excluded from having 
any connective ties and belonging to Singapore once their employment sojourn ends. This pre-empts their 
presence in Singapore from becoming a site for contestation over rights, privileges and belonging. 
      
    Central to this narrative of belonging or a lack thereof, is the concept of citizenship. In Singapore, the 
citizenship concept is undergirded by a policy and ideological framework that invariably places a 
premium on one's ability to contribute to societal well-being, measured in pragmatic dimensions of 
economic worth and demographic relevance. Equality of treatment is not a core concern. Indeed, the 
bifurcated regime that has developed around the abovementioned two categories of women highlights that 
the process and outcome in defining who belongs is not characterised by rights, but by the patriarchal 
tendency to conform to and support the communitarian interests of Singapore society. 
      
    I begin by setting the context with a brief discussion on the institutional importance of the family in 
Singapore in an evolving landscape buffeted by globalisation mores, demographic realities and changing 
social norms. I then consider the first group of women, Singaporean women married to non-Singaporean 
spouses, and examine the constitutional changes to citizenship laws in 2004. I then juxtapose these 
changes with the regulatory regime for foreign domestic workers to examine the bifurcated approach 
taken by the Singaporean authorities in managing the two groups of women. 
 
 
    The institution of the family in Singapore 
      
    Singapore subscribes steadfastly to the traditional concept of the family based on the legal marriage 
between a man and a woman and any resulting children from the matrimonial union. The family is 
regarded as 'the basic unit of society' in Singapore's five Shared Values, a putative national ideology 
introduced in 1991, and the importance of the family is regularly underlined in Singapore's official 
discourse.[12] The government is forthright in declaring Singapore to be a patriarchal society where the 
man is the head of the household and the woman's role is to care and nurture the family, even though 
many married women now have professional careers.[13] Public policies have to support this normative 
ideal. Until the turn of the twenty-first century, the unequal treatment of women included inferior benefits 
for female civil servants, a quota on female medical students, and gender-biased citizenship laws were a 
pertinent source of unhappiness for women parliamentarians and women activists.[14] 
      
    The state of the family is also conceived to intimately affect the state of the nation. This is premised on 
the belief that the 'good family' will take care of itself. Consequently, the nation-state—as a collection of 
'good families'—will be strong as well. The family is also regarded as the formative source of social 
capital in a communitarian society, a 'fundamental building block out of which larger social structures can 
be stably constructed.'[15] The family then is a site for the reproduction of state ideologies, values and 
norms. In this social reproduction process, parents have a responsibility to prepare their children to be 
'good parents and citizens.'[16] Congruent with its strong and publicly declared anti-welfare state stance, 
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the Singapore family is expected to be the first recourse for help when an individual falls on hard times, 
with the state intervening only as a last resort.[17] 
      
    Thus, marriages and the formation of families are seen as key concerns of the 'nanny state.' There are 
government-supported civil society efforts to complement state-led efforts in matchmaking, promotion of 
healthy marriages and responsible childbearing.[18] As with other essays in this edited volume that 
highlight the impact of socio-economic changes on gender issues, Singapore society has to adapt to the 
multi-faceted changes to and influences on the family. For instance, there has been a rapid increase in the 
number of non-Singaporeans now residing in Singapore. A related development is that Singaporeans in 
international marriages are more common today.[19] Between 2000 and 2002, the number of foreigners 
granted permanent residence under the sponsorship of their Singaporean spouses increased from 4,000 to 
5,800.20 In 1998, about three in ten marriages (33 percent) involving Singapore citizens and registered in 
Singapore were international marriages. In 2008, the figure was almost four in ten (39 percent); the figure 
was as high as 41 percent in 2005 and it has in the last few years stabilised at about four in ten marriages 
being international marriages.[21] Based on the 2010 Census of Population, there were an estimated 
114,000 married couples comprising a citizen and a non-citizen. Most (86 percent) of the non-citizen 
spouses were permanent residents, with the remainder residing on other pass types such as the long-term 
visit pass. However, the actual number of Singaporeans in international marriages is probably higher as 
some of these marriages were entered into outside of Singapore and were not subsequently registered in 
Singapore under the Women's Charter or the Administration of Muslim Law Act. 
      
    Another phenomenon is the inclination among young Singaporeans towards living and working 
overseas. A recent survey found that Singaporean teens are more open to emigrating than their Asian 
peers. While 53 percent of the Singaporean teenagers surveyed would consider emigration, a higher figure 
of two-thirds would like to work abroad.[22] An estimated 207,000 Singaporeans (or about 6 percent of 
the total number of Singapore citizens) were working, studying and living abroad in 2013.[23] 
      
    Thus, in today's context, the Singaporean family increasingly consists of mixed and multiple 
nationalities and/or members living in various jurisdictions. An important constituency, this 
internationalisation of the Singaporean family has led the Singapore government to speak of an 'Overseas 
Singaporean diaspora' that is 'growing and making significant contributions wherever they are.'[24] In 
2006, the Singapore Government established the Overseas Singaporean Unit (OSU) under the Prime 
Minister's Office to enable the government to better engage overseas Singaporeans in a more concerted 
manner.[25] Learning from the experience of how other states have effectively engaged their own 
diasporas, Singapore is increasingly receptive towards moving from a place-centred national 
identity/citizenship to one where there is 'psychic attachment to Singapore.'[26] 
      
    This represents a marked departure from the somewhat derogatory labelling (as recently as in 1999 and 
2002) of those who chose to emigrate or work overseas as 'quitters' and 'cosmopolitans,' in contrast to the 
home-bound 'stayers' and 'heartlanders' who form the core of Singaporean society. Today, the inclusive 
conception of 'rootedness' to Singapore pragmatically seeks to have Singaporean emigrants think of 
Singapore as home and nation even if they have emigrated.[27] The family acquires even greater 
prominence in such a transnational environment, and the granting of citizenship takes centre-stage in 
demarcating who belongs and who does not to a nation-state. 
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    Dealing with (once) troublesome women: citizenship law as gate-keeper 
      
    A citizenship law regime circumscribes in fairly clear and rigid terms the place of citizens and non-
citizens within a nation-state. This gate-keeping function is particularly germane in the Singapore context. 
Traditionally, citizenship has an in situ element wherein the connection between citizens and their country 
is expressed predominantly through physical residence in the home country. Through its conferment of 
legal status and rights, citizenship creates boundaries that seek to include members and exclude non-
members based on ascribed attributes, identities and values. Citizenship then becomes a platform by 
which the citizen and the state engage each other on the basis of their rights and responsibilities within 
territorial boundaries and, increasingly, extra-territorially. 
      
    International marriages, however, challenge the conventional thinking and understanding of 
citizenship, as they make more pronounced the decoupling of citizenship and residence. In a globalised 
context, the transnational and trans-border dimensions sit uncomfortably with the notions of state 
sovereignty, control and jurisdiction. Solely defined by territorial boundaries, the jurisdictional bounds of 
such laws are increasingly perceived by mobile citizens as being unduly restrictive and citizen-unfriendly. 
This has necessitated a re-conceptualisation of citizenship, especially of citizen-emigrants, in particular 
children from those unions who are born outside Singapore. As Kim Barry noted, 'Citizenship—so long a 
symbol of rootedness, exclusivity, and permanence—has been discovered to be portable, exchangeable, 
and increasingly multiple.'[28] Prior to 2004, international marriages threw into sharp relief the inequality 
and limitations of the traditional understanding of citizenship as understood in Singapore. 
      
    Increasingly, a state's citizenship regime in the global competitive economy needs to be sensitive at two 
levels, both of which may have competing and perhaps even contradictory objectives. At one level, it 
needs to be responsive to local constituencies in the nation-building quest. At another level, it needs to be 
responsive to the competitive and aggressive immigration regimes in other countries that compete to 
attract the same talent pool. With intense competition for talented immigrants, Singapore cannot afford to 
adopt a citizenship regime that marginalises international marriages involving Singaporeans. With more 
Singaporeans overseas and Singapore's own urgent need for foreign talent to drive its economy and grow 
its population, Singapore increasingly has to adopt international practices and norms as well as shed its 
patriarchal inclinations in the maintenance of the Singapore citizenship regime. 
 
        Constitutional changes in 2004 to effect gender-equal citizenship laws 
 
    Singapore citizenship laws have remained largely unchanged since Singapore became independent in 
August 1965.[29] Citizenship was and remains jealously guarded, congruent with the political need to 
create, out of a society of immigrant backgrounds, a coherent national identity and to secure the 
citizenry's loyalty to the fledging nation-state. Under Article 120 of Singapore's Constitution, a person 
may acquire Singapore citizenship through any one of four means: by birth; by descent; by registration or, 
before the commencement of the Constitution, by enrolment; or by naturalisation. Citizenship in 
Singapore is accorded either on the jus soli or jus sanguinis principle although both are applied in a 
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limited manner. To acquire citizenship by birth (jus soli), the person must be born in Singapore and either 
parent must be a Singapore citizen. For citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis), the transmission of 
citizenship from generation to generation was not always automatic but only available in specific 
instances. 
      
    In 2004, landmark changes were made to relax the restrictions on the granting of citizenship by descent 
and to increase the length of time a person may spend away from Singapore when considering the 
residence period for citizenship applications.[30] Prior to the 2004 constitutional amendment, the former 
Article 122 provided for the granting of citizenship by descent to a child of a Singaporean, when the child 
was born abroad prior to 15 May 2004, only if the father was a Singapore citizen by birth or registration. 
If the child's father was a Singapore citizen by descent, or if only the mother was a Singaporean, neither 
parent could automatically transmit their Singapore citizenship to the child. Singaporean women could 
still pass on their citizenship, by registration (rather than descent), to their foreign-born child, but this was 
not conferred as a matter of right. With the amendments to Article 122, a foreign-born child born on or 
after 15 May 2004 to a Singaporean mother can now acquire citizenship by descent, making the grant of 
citizenship by descent gender-neutral. 
      
    Further, after the 2004 constitutional amendments, parents who are Singapore citizens by descent can 
also pass on citizenship by descent to their foreign-born children, provided these parents meet a residency 
criterion to demonstrate the requisite nexus to Singapore. The parent who is a Singapore citizen by 
descent needs to have stayed in Singapore for a total of five years or more cumulatively over his or her 
entire life up to the birth of the child.[31] Alternatively, that parent has to have stayed in Singapore for a 
total of at least two years out of the five years immediately prior to the birth of the child.[32] This could 
not be done previously and such children could only acquire citizenship by registration. 
      
    The policy rationale for the limited application of the jus sanguinis principle, which tended to affect 
foreign-born children of Singaporeans in international marriages most severely, was to ensure that 
Singapore would not have 'generations of absentee Singaporeans with no real links to Singapore.'[33] 
Interestingly, up to three years prior to these significant changes to the citizenship law regime, there was 
little indication that such a policy shift was in the making. 
 
        Shedding Patriarchy? 
      
    In its January 2000 and April 2001 reports required under the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which Singapore ratified in 1995, the Singapore 
government had defended its gender-biased citizenship laws on the basis that they were in line with 
'Asian tradition where husbands are the heads of households' and that a Singaporean woman married to a 
foreigner could apply for her children to be Singapore citizens by registration under her own 
sponsorship.[34] 
      
    This reliance on and defence of the 'Asian tradition' of patriarchy was not persuasive despite its claim 
of supposed cultural affinity. The official view was that Singaporean women who moved overseas were 
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cutting themselves off from Singapore and their families, and that they were dependent on their foreign 
husbands (or vice-versa). In paternalistic fashion, the state viewed a Singaporean female citizen in an 
international marriage and who had emigrated as having opted to exclude herself from the larger 
Singapore family: an anti-national act as it were. As such, the policy thinking was that since the mother 
had consciously sought to exclude herself from Singapore, her foreign-born children should not be 
afforded the option of having Singapore citizenship by descent. It is precisely this paternalism and 
chauvinism of seeing women as mere dependents in marriages and in the migration process that had 
prevented equal rights being accorded to Singaporean women in international marriages prior to 
2004.[35] 
      
    However, in its third CEDAW report in November 2004, after the abovementioned constitutional 
changes to the citizenship laws were effected, the Singapore government highlighted the constitutional 
amendment as a key example of its commitment to improving the position and rights of Singaporean 
women.[36] This about-turn did not pivot on the 'Asian tradition' of patriarchy relied upon in the first two 
CEDAW reports that Singapore filed. Clearly, the earlier approach of valorising culture and patriarchy 
could not be reconciled with the fact that the previous citizenship laws were, in essence, discriminatory 
and counter-productive. 
      
    Earlier that year (2004), in responding to questions raised during the parliamentary debate on the 
citizenship law changes, then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong assured Parliament that 'we are 
doing it [making citizenship laws gender-neutral] for the right reason but there is a purpose.' The purpose 
was 'to bring our rules up to date and in keeping with the times and the tenor of the society we live in': 
 
        Many of the women who go overseas are professionals. They marry foreigners. They keep their links 
with Singapore. They have not just opted out from Singapore society. They have families and friends on 
both sides, but they come back to Singapore from time to time…. They are our people and we have to 
look after them. As I have suggested from the numbers that I produced just now, more and more 
Singaporean women are doing this. A lot of our daughters who travel overseas and study overseas marry 
and live overseas. But they have parents here and they keep their links back here.[37]  
    Such women marriage emigrants are now no longer regarded as 'deserters' to be marginalised from the 
Singapore polity but should be treated as citizens abroad who can still contribute to Singapore in more 
ways than one. This could be attributed to the reality of a limited brain drain. The change in laws seeks 
not only to facilitate 'brain circulation' but also to reduce the 'leakage' of talented women and their 
children. In 2008, about 30 percent of citizen births were from international marriages.[38] 
      
    Notwithstanding the government's stance that the citizenship law changes were motivated by the ideal 
of gender parity, the government assertively reiterated that it was 'a statement of fact' that Singapore was 
still a patrilineal society. Recognising that the changes would still leave Singapore's citizenship regime 
twenty years behind that of the United States and the United Kingdom, Deputy Prime Minister Lee 
justified the conservative approach as one of maintaining social ballast and letting other countries take the 
lead so that Singapore had the benefit of observing over one to two generations if these leading edge 
social changes would make sense and benefit Singapore. 
 
 8 
 
 
 
        The political economy of international marriages and the race for talent 
      
    Although the parliamentary debate on the matter highlighted the motivating factor of gender equality, 
there was hardly any discussion that the constitutional amendment was just as, if not more, motivated by 
the pressing concerns of rapidly declining birth rates, the increased occurrences of international 
marriages, and the politico-economic benefits of having a gender-neutral citizenship regime. The only 
acknowledgement of the latter factor was the reference to the fact that 'many of the women who go 
overseas are professionals.' This pithy statement encapsulates the transformative changes that have taken 
place since the government's passing of the Women's Charter in September 1961.[39] Singaporean 
women are now as well educated as, if not better educated than, their male counterparts and have better 
employment opportunities locally and abroad.[40] 
      
    International marriages involving Singapore female citizens raise the likelihood of their potential or 
permanent emigration, which would be a further strain on Singapore's already limited human capital. 
Moreover, given the state's belief that better educated parents beget brighter children, the prospect of 
'losing' Singaporean mothers and their foreign-born children is a potential human resource loss that 
should be avoided in light of Singapore's demographic challenges of persistently low birth rates, delayed 
marriages and a rapidly ageing population.[41] As the government-sponsored Remaking Singapore 
Committee noted in its 2003 report: 
 
        Our current [pre-May 2004] citizenship policy does not encourage the rooting of the Singaporean 
man/woman, his/her foreign spouse and their children to Singapore. With increased globalization and our 
relatively open policy towards foreign talent, there is a danger that we could lose a significant number of 
our better-educated daughters, and their offspring, through Singaporean-foreigner marriages if they 
perceive that we do not value them as much as we value our male citizens and their offspring.[42]  
    Although no significant brain drain had yet taken place, the citizenship law changes provided the 
crucial nexus between absent Singapore citizens and the prospect of their return migration or talent 
circulation. 
      
    The granting to Singaporean women the right to transmit to their foreign-born children citizenship by 
descent, as of right, helps ensure that they do not prematurely exclude Singapore in terms of their 
nationality choices and as a putative home for themselves, their children and foreign spouses. This seems 
to be borne out by the data following the 2004 citizenship law changes. Between 2000 and 2004, an 
annual average of 700 Singapore citizenships was granted by descent to minors born overseas to 
Singapore citizens. Almost two-thirds of these minors (or 64 percent) declared that they were holding a 
foreign citizenship at the point of registration for Singapore citizenship. Between 2005 and 2009, there 
was a 36 percent increase (to 1,100) in the number of Singapore citizenships by descent granted annually 
to minors born overseas to Singapore citizens. For this group, 68 percent of these minors declared that 
they were holding a foreign citizenship at the point of registration for Singapore citizenship.[43] 
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    This reflects the reality that international marriages and the global pursuit of human capital conspire to 
challenge the notion of place-bound citizenship. Developed countries such as Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and many European Union countries are competing to make 
themselves attractive immigration destinations. These countries aim to appeal to the well-educated 
segment of the potential migrant pool to augment their human resource capability in their knowledge-
based economies. In Asia, economic success is also increasingly dependent on the state's ability to 
articulate and engage with transnational networks and global professionals who not only embrace self-
enterprising values but practise 'flexible citizenship' in tandem with their mobility.[44] More than ever, 
citizenship rights and benefits are 'contingent upon individual market performance.'[45] As Ayelet 
Shachar notes of the race for talent and knowledge workers, 'it is the human in "human capital" that 
makes it a unique, distinct, and irreplaceable resource.'[46] 
      
    The 2004 citizenship law changes reflect the larger reality that Singapore's citizenship regime can no 
longer remain isolated from global developments. The citizenship regime and the immigration and 
emigration policies need to be as competitive as other countries that seek to attract the best-qualified 
migrants. Singapore has had to reconceptualise membership boundaries for its citizenry in order to better 
attract foreign talent and also not to lose home-grown talent especially among those in international 
marriages and/or who live overseas.[47] 
      
    What might be the economic benefits to Singapore from taking a more nuanced and less paternalistic 
view of international marriages? Singapore's economy is not dependent on remittances from its overseas-
based nationals. Rather, it is the intangible human capital 'losses' that worry the political elite. Absent 
citizens or former citizens with positive affective bonds to Singapore may create economic opportunities 
in/for Singapore through investments or entering into economic partnerships with Singaporean businesses 
or individuals, whether in Singapore or overseas. The government has also not foreclosed the return 
migration of overseas Singaporeans and, to a lesser extent, ex-citizens as well. Here the Singapore 
government is learning from the network capitalism experience of diasporic Indian, Chinese and Jewish 
entrepreneurs who move regularly between the United States and their ancestral homelands, establishing 
substantial cross-border economic activity, capital transfers through investments, collaborative 
technology transfer, access to markets, entrepreneurial connections and information networks.[48] 
      
    Singapore's fledgling efforts to be a key knowledge arbitrageur in Asia will also depend on its ability to 
capitalise on the putative Singapore diaspora that it views as a potential source of socio-economic and 
cultural opportunities and engagement between the rest of the world and a rising Asia.[49] Seen in this 
light, the shift towards gender-equal citizenship laws is not only long overdue but necessary. Because of 
the legislation of gender-equal citizenship laws, Singaporean women with foreign husbands have become 
less 'troublesome' vis-à-vis their male counterparts with foreign wives. 
      
    However, this ostensible gender equality is not manifested where it concerns foreign workers. Just as 
Singapore has to adapt to the phenomenon of the movement of people for purposes of work, education 
and lifestyle choices, it also has to 'import' foreign women, especially for domestic work. Unsurprisingly, 
the patriarchal state has always regarded these women as necessitating close management in order that 
they do not become 'troublesome.' 
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    Dealing with (perceived) troublesome women from abroad 
      
    Singapore has one of the highest numbers of foreign domestic workers (FDWs) per one thousand 
households in the world: In 2011, it was 175 FDWs per one thousand households. This was higher than 
Hong Kong's 122 per one thousand households. There are currently about 211,000 foreign domestic 
workers (FDWs) working in Singapore; in December 2007, the figure was 183,200. This translates to 
almost one in five households in Singapore employing at least one FDW,[50] demonstrating the impact of 
what has been popularly referred to as 'global care chains' and 'transnational mothering.'[51] The number 
of FDWs has steadily increased over the last three decades as more Singaporean married women work 
and as Singapore ages relatively rapidly. To help regulate demand for FDWs and other transient workers 
by reducing excessive reliance on them, the government imposes a foreign worker levy. In fact, without 
the government-imposed FDW monthly levy of SG$265 (of which the concession levy is SG$170), the 
number of FDWs in Singapore would certainly be greater.[52] Work permits for employment as FDWs 
are issued only to females from approved source countries. Most FDWs in Singapore come from the 
Philippines and Indonesia, with smaller numbers coming from Sri Lanka and Myanmar (Burma).[53] 
      
    The relative ease and affordability of hiring FDWs in Singapore have been a boon for many 
Singaporean households, especially dual income ones, enabling many married Singaporean women to 
seek employment outside the home.[54] A study has suggested that FDWs in Singapore (and Hong Kong) 
help raised the income of local low-skilled Singaporean workers by 3.9 percent, and contributed to a 1.2 
percent boost in the overall income of the economy. The same study stated that FDWs also helped reduce 
the wage gap between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.[55] Nevertheless, the presence of almost 1.3 
million foreign workers (and professionals) in Singapore has provoked knee-jerk criticism and irrational 
fears that transient foreign workers, in general, cost local workers their jobs, depress local wages and are 
prone to vice and criminal activity.[56] 
 
 
        Privileging contractual law: of surveillance, control and regulation of FDWs 
      
    Singapore's openness to immigration for demographic, economic and political imperatives should not 
be mistaken as the state's relinquishing control and influence over such movements of people. Its 
acceptance of transient foreign workers co-exists with an extensive surveillance system to ensure that 
these workers do not become permanent residents or citizens. The trade-off between openness and rights 
characterises the labour immigration policies of many high-income countries, including Singapore.[57] 
Transient foreign workers, including FDWs, are given work permits to work in Singapore on the 
condition that they will leave the country at the end of their work contracts. Even before entering 
Singapore for employment, they must also agree to not making any claim to Singapore citizenship. 
Significantly, Singapore does not subscribe to the principle that a foreigner, by virtue of having worked 
and lived for an extended period in Singapore, acquires a moral or legal entitlement to rights of 
membership, including citizenship. For Singapore, unlike liberal western democracies, according the 
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rights of citizenship or permanent residence is considered a prerogative of national sovereignty, not one of 
moral equity earned or conferred benevolently on migrants. 
      
    As such, borders become 'central places of anxiety about control and sovereignty.'[58] Border controls 
inform us why and how a state governs access to and control over matters such as employment, family 
unification, residency, citizenship and the like, which many citizens take for granted. While most transient 
workers in Singapore are not preoccupied with making Singapore their permanent home, their 
expectations are nonetheless adroitly managed from the outset. The conditions attached to their work 
permits ensure that the workers are fully alive to this reality of exclusion through a contractual 
undertaking that they will not be able to secure full membership in the Singapore polity. 
 
        Marriage restriction policy 
    This overarching message that transient foreign workers are unsuitable for inclusion into Singapore 
society is reinforced by the marriage restriction policy, another onerous condition governing the conduct 
of transient foreign workers and which could potentially affect their life chances. The marriage restriction 
policy's primary objective is to ensure that the temporary labour migration of low-skilled workers does 
not become permanent through subsequent marriages with Singapore citizens or permanent residents. 
Under this policy, a foreign work-permit holder 'shall not go through any form of marriage under any law, 
religion, custom or usage with a Singapore Citizen or Permanent Resident in or outside Singapore without 
the prior approval of the Controller [of Immigration], while he/she holds a Work Permit, and also after 
his/her Work Permit has expired or has cancelled or revoked.'[59] Those who marry a Singapore resident 
without approval during the course of their employment in Singapore will be repatriated and disallowed 
future entry into Singapore. 
      
    These conditions apply even after the foreign worker's work permit has expired or has been cancelled 
or revoked.[60] This draconian approach to the marriage restriction policy has been justified as follows: 
 
        So imagine if every other ex-work permit holder were to marry a Singaporean, we would not be able 
to manage our social services and social system…. Even though we want to increase our population size, 
we have to ensure that those who want to live and have families in Singapore can look after themselves, 
their children and their families. That is the basic premise that we all must understand…. Singaporeans do 
have human rights to be able to look after ourselves and manage our limited resources and to ensure that 
those legitimate Singaporeans would be well looked after and would not exact too much of our social 
system [emphasis added].[61]  
    For a government that generally refrains from a governance discourse premised on rights, this selective 
use of human rights and how the human rights of Singaporeans need to be balanced against that of non-
Singaporeans is interesting. Although the human rights of 'legitimate Singaporeans' (to be well looked 
after) are prioritised, the regulatory regime governing the transient foreign workers consciously resists 
such a rights-based approach. 
      
    For FDWs, the regulatory framework extends to surveillance of their physical bodies. FDWs are 
required to go for a six-monthly medical examination (6ME) by a registered Singapore doctor 'to screen 
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for infectious diseases and pregnancies.' A FDW who fails the 6ME will be repatriated immediately. 
According to the Manpower Ministry: 
 
        The 6ME helps to ensure that FDWs do not carry infectious diseases such as HIV [sic] or TB, which 
might harm them or the people they come into contact with. This is especially important as they work in a 
residential environment and may have contact with children. A pregnancy test is also required for the 
FDWs. A FDW who fails the 6ME should be repatriated immediately.[62]  
    In addition, the 'Conditions for Work Permit/Visit Pass for Foreign Worker' stipulates that the FDW 
'shall not become pregnant or deliver any child in Singapore during and after the validity period of her 
Work Permit, unless she is a Work Permit holder who is already married to a Singapore Citizen or 
Permanent Resident with the approval of the Controller.' Another condition is that the 'foreign employee 
shall not be involved in any illegal, immoral or undesirable activities, including breaking up families in 
Singapore'.[63] 
      
    The pervasive reach of this employment condition even after the period of employment emphatically 
marks this group of workers, especially the women who are FDWs, as transient and 'unacceptable' for 
inclusion into Singapore society.[64] The image of foreigners taking advantage of Singapore's social 
welfare system in the absence of controls is also regularly portrayed and, in fact, used to justify the 
onerous marriage restriction policy. Stripped of official legalese, the marriage restriction policy helps 
ensure that temporary labour migration of unskilled and low-skilled workers does not become permanent 
through subsequent marriages with Singapore residents. It also reifies the stereotype of the low-skilled 
foreign workers as having the invariable disposition and intention to be dependents of the state and/or 
their Singapore spouses.[65] Marriage and mothering for this group of workers are premised on their not 
being desirable for Singapore society. This elitist mind-set and, arguably, eugenics-accented policy results 
in a set of particularist immigration and employment regulations that also effectively operate as a de facto 
family law and citizenship law.[66] 
      
    The fear of migrants as potential burdens to and parasitic of Singapore society is therefore managed 
through a rigorous gate-keeping function whereby the granting of 'citizen' or 'permanent resident' status is 
a means of determining who gets to enjoy rights and benefits such as social services, government 
subsidies and grants. Even foreign spouses of Singaporeans, if they are not Singapore citizens or 
permanent residents, do not enjoy subsidies for the use of medical services, education and public housing. 
In response to societal concerns that Singapore citizenship carries no obvious pecuniary advantage, the 
policy approach in recent years has been to differentiate more clearly between citizens, permanent 
residents (PRs), and non-citizens and non-PRs.[67] 
      
    The marriage restriction policy can be understood as an attempt by the state at institutional control over 
citizenship grants, in tandem with its policy objectives and concerns in the areas of population, talent 
attraction, and the all-important economic objectives. At the same time, through the marriage restriction 
policy, the state effectively generates a hierarchy of international marriages characterised by their relative 
potential contributions (especially economic) to Singapore, their ease of social integration, and their 
perceived likely demand on the public welfare and social system. 
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    The Singapore government is alive to the potential of international marriages becoming an arena of 
contention over rights, privileges and access to employment, government services and assistance. It 
ensures that contestation is reduced, if not pre-empted, by resolutely maintaining a marital union regime 
that characterises marriages involving Singapore residents and FDWs as 'troublesome,' if not 
'problematic.' Thus, immigration and employment laws and regulations in Singapore retain their utility as 
strategic gate-keeping tools that simultaneously exclude, maintain inequalities and enforce status 
hierarchies. Together, the law emphasises the residual but still potent power of the Singapore state in 
discriminating and placing significant constraints on the Singapore citizen or permanent resident's choice 
of life partner, especially where it involves a foreign worker on a work permit working in Singapore. 
      
    The discriminatory attitude and the instrumental regulatory framework towards the foreign workers in 
general may have spawned the unfortunate cases of foreign workers being poorly treated over the years. 
Reports of foreign workers being unpaid, abandoned or housed in poor conditions are regularly covered in 
the local media.[68] Indeed, the conditions attached to a FDW's work permit would strike many as being 
unfair, unjust and discriminatory. 
      
    However, there is no public clamour as yet for removing such onerous conditions of employment. At 
one level, it may reflect the callousness of the immigration policy in place as well as the apathy of the 
average Singaporean towards human rights, especially when it concerns foreign workers with a transient 
presence in Singapore performing menial jobs. At another level, it may well reflect a situation in which 
all parties, including the FDWs and the authorities, are fully aware of their respective legal standing. Even 
where rights are fully in play, and even then asymmetrically since the foreign worker has to accept the 
conditions without question, they are focused almost exclusively on contractual rights of the Singapore 
state vis-à-vis the transient foreign workers. The promotion and protection of human rights vis-àvis the 
FDWs do not enter public discourse in Singapore in any significant way.[69] 
 
    Pre-empting trouble: avoiding contestation over rights and privileges 
    Notwithstanding that marriage is, in essence, a private matter between two persons, the intimacy and 
privacy of marriage has public policy implications in Singapore in areas such as citizenship rights and 
family law. For Singapore citizens in international marriages, the transnational nature of such unions 
invariably challenges in various ways state sovereignty, state ideology and policies on the family, and the 
application of citizenship laws. Where transient foreign workers are concerned, the Singapore state is 
fully alive to and seeks to pre-empt any rights contestation. This attitude towards FDWs stands in stark 
contrast to the changed attitude of the authorities towards Singaporean women with foreign spouses and 
their foreign-born children. 
      
    Significant as the 2004 constitutional changes to Singapore's citizenship laws were, it should be borne 
in mind that the changes were not as liberal as they were thought to be. While it removed the gender bias, 
the citizenship law and regime persisted in imposing severe limits with respect to equality vis-à-vis 
marital unions involving a foreign partner. Certain categories of international marriages, in particular 
those between Singapore citizens or permanent residents and unskilled/lowly-skilled work permit holders 
such as male construction workers and female domestic workers, require prior permission from the state. 
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As such, immigration and employment laws in Singapore potentially retain their utility to exclude, create 
inequalities and reify hierarchies. 
      
    State sovereignty and state patriarchy, while seemingly challenged by international marriages as the 
2004 constitutional amendment in Singapore implicitly recognised, are still preserved rather than wholly 
negated. While both state sovereignty and state patriarchy may be weakened at the margins, they arguably 
are securely maintained at the core. Singapore's bifurcated embrace of international marriages requires us 
to re-look the apparent 'liberalisation' of attitudes, policies and laws in this area against the background of 
the state's domineering conception of Singapore society as patriarchal. Much as the citizenship law 
changes positively affect children born of such unions, the state also benefits by embracing such a societal 
change. 
      
    By making Singapore's citizenship law gender-neutral, the role of the family as an important social 
institution is underscored by ensuring that Singaporean women in international marriages can transmit, as 
of right, their citizenship to their foreign-born children. More importantly, where the government is 
concerned, such family units despite being overseas can have powerful links with Singapore, enabling a 
continued, if limited, institutional influence over the family as the basic building block of Singapore 
society. Such residual influence may be used for other instrumental purposes. This underscores the state's 
ideological apparatus and policy framework vis-à-vis the family is capable of adapting to the trend of 
international marriages. 
 
    Conclusion 
    The immigration of talented people is often rationalised unilaterally by the state as being good for 
Singapore and its people. In contrast, FDWs are conceptualised and treated as being unsuitable for 
inclusion into Singapore society. Yet this bifurcated regime is necessary and relied upon because 
intellectual talent, technical know-how, and sinews are needed to ensure that the engines of the economy 
can roar. It entails a heavy reliance on the contracts that FDWs have to enter into with the state and 
employer with regards to her macro- and micro-existence during the tenure of her employment. This 
heavy reliance on a FDW agreeing to the conditions that come with her work permit highlights the 
prominence of a market fundamentalism based on contracts functioning both as a legal agreement and as 
a form of social control and regulation. 
      
    Furthermore, with the objective to exclude, the restrictions and surveillance mandated that flow from 
the issuance of the work permits to FDWs could be described as the 'governmentality by exclusion.' This 
extension of border control to the personal realm (for instance, the regular medical examinations required) 
and the extra-territorial reach (via the marriage restriction policy) suggest the prominence of control and 
discipline, highlighting the paradigm of exclusion through regulation. While the liberal approach 
advocates granting citizenship rights to foreigners who have lived and worked in a state for an extended 
period, such a position has little traction in Singapore. Instead, immigration policies and laws 
circumscribe in fairly clear and rigid terms the differentiated status of various migrant groups within the 
nation-state. Through its conferment of differentiated legal status and rights, immigrant status and 
citizenship entitlements create boundaries that seek to include members and exclude non-members based 
on ascribed attributes, identities and values. 
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    Besides highlighting the inherent limits to the state's power of discursive constructions of gender in the 
national interest, the Singapore case demonstrates that contemporary immigration and globalisation have 
challenged the conventional thinking and understanding of citizenship, and notions of who belongs and 
who does not. Increasing international marriages and pervasive in- and out-migration for purposes of 
employment, study and family make more pronounced the decoupling of citizenship and residence. This 
transnational dimension continues to sit uncomfortably with the state's imperatives of sovereignty, control 
and jurisdiction. In the final analysis, Singapore's state paternalism as the essence and embodiment of the 
nation and state authority ensures that the bifurcated approach towards the management of 'troublesome 
women' will endure for the foreseeable future. 
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